February 13, 2010 01:55 AM UTC

Operation Mushtarak has Begun in Afghanistan

• 6 Comments
• by: SSG_Dan

“When we’re in Hue City, it’s like a war. Y’know, like what I thought a war was supposed to be like. There’s the enemy, kill ’em.”

Private Cowboy, Full Metal Jacket

I’ve been following the buildup to this operation for about the last 4 weeks. Part of it has been a debate I’ve had with myself (and others) about the Military and Civilian “surge” plans that President Obama has implemented this year. At first, I wanted to do an in-depth critique of both sides of the operation. But, I couldn’t find all the info I wanted on the Civilian side of things, and I had too much info I didn’t want to reveal about the Military.

So, instead, I’m going to try and explain what has happened prior to Operation Mushtarak, why it was important, and what happens next over the weekend.

1) Cobra’s Anger. This got very little press when it launched last year. Even though it involved about 1000 UK, US and Afghan troops, it was an essential operation prior to Mushtarak’s start.

It had three basic objectives:

*cut Taliban supply and communication lines, and force them to re-establish new ones in bad weather conditions and while under observation.

*act as a test run for large-scale mine and IED clearing operations.

*be a large show-of-force for tribal and city elders.

The last one is most important. Prior to these operations, most of the engagements made by NATO forces were small unit operations, usually less than a platoon (36-45 troops). Cobra’s Anger was one of the first Company (125-ish)  and Battalion (hundreds) level operation since OEF, and it was necessary to show these elders that the Coalition could pull off large unit attacks.

2) Supply Drops.

Hidden very well on the www.defense.gov website are several articles about the massive supply buildup implemented since GEN McSpook took over in AFPAK. (All of them are gone at them moment.) For those of not skilled in Operations, Logistics is far more important to an operation than the type of troopsk used. Based on the three press releases I’ve saved off, Operation Mushtarak is well-supplied for at least 4 months of sustained, high-tempo operations.

This is important based on the goat-rope that was OIF. Units that were racing toward Baghdad were out of supply the 2nd or 3rd day. That meant Engineer units were scrounging for explosives from Iraqi artillery shells they found on the side of the road. There were no MP or logistical units to direct traffic, leading to 2nd LT’s driving their convoys into Iraqi Positions. And several times, columns of tanks and APCs had to stop and wait for diesel and ammo to be driven to them by overworked transportation units.

This is not going to happen in this operation. The assault is well-sustained, and attacking units can keep up the heat on the Taliban without ever stopping. And since supply lines to the Taliban were cut off (or severely reduced depending on who you believe) by Cobra’s Anger, the 1000 or so troops they have in Marhat will run out of ammunition very rapidly, esp. since they’ve been taking pot-shots at the Marines for the last few days.

3) Small Unit conflict vs Brigade Operations. NATO forces and (esp US forces) work best at Brigade level. A Brigade in the US Army is about 2500-4000 troops, depending on it’s type. They are made up of Tanks, Infantry (with or without armored personnel carriers) helicopters, logistical and medical units. Marines only form Brigades for special missions like this, and vary in size from 2000-4000 troops. They also have a variety of units, but have more combat aviation assets to blow shit up.

Excluding the original invasion of Afghanistan, almost all of the operations to date in AFPAK have been at small unit level. We’ve been sending in squads and companies to screw around in the Pashtun Hillbilly’s turf, which tends to be about even in terms of a fight with the Taliban, and probably in their favor since they know the terrain.

This time, we’re attacking the Taliban in a fight we know very, very well. Instead of poking the Taliban with a finger, we’re going to be smacking them with fists. This (hopefully) won’t be another Battle of Fallujah, were we flattened a city to get the insurgents. But there’s even more firepower being used on this operation that Fallujah.

4) The long, long lead-up to the attack. This had two main objectives:

*get as many civilians to leave the city as possible, including any $10 Taliban that decided that the pay was not worth the risk anymore, and

*play into the cultural mores of extended negotiation.

Using the word “Arab” in this context is misguided, but a part of Arabic Culture is negotiation. (I’d call it haggling, but whatever.) The lead-up to this operation had to have lots of time built into it for extended negotiations with tribal elders, city leaders, Taliban leaders, and other interested parties (drug lords.) The terms were set, threats were made, deals were cut, and after the Taliban are driven/retreat/bled in from Marjah, things will probably come back to normal pretty quickly in the city.

I have no doubt that there’s going to be some gruesome casualties from this operation – mostly by the Taliban, and probably more than a few civilians. But the Taliban could not back down from this fight, having repeatedly postured that this was the town they would defend to the death, so they’ll suffer a a very public defeat at the hands of the coalition.

THAT might be more valuable than the actual military victory.  

Articles to read:

http://www.alertnet.org/thenew…

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35…

http://online.wsj.com/article/…

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02…