Canadian Free Speech

8 thoughts on “Canadian Free Speech”

1. What was once mere vandalism (e.g., an anti-gay slur found on a restroom wall) suddenly becomes a federal hate crime.  There is no way to reasonably spin this as anything other than prosecution for “thought crime.”

   How typical of you Rio. You cut out the parts that disagree with your premise, sorta like how you cut the parts out of caselaw that disagree with your preconceived agenda, leading you to get shut down by the courts over and over that disagree with your special brand of “interpretation” of the law.

   Let’s see how Rio works:

   Rio posts the following as the text of the bill:

   [a]uthorizes the Attorney General to provide technical, forensic, prosecutorial, or other assistance in the criminal investigation or prosecution of any crime that… is motivated by prejudice based on the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability of the victim or is a violation of the state, local, or tribal hate crime laws.

   This, according to him, “proves” that such vandalism would be a Federal hate crime. But notice that “…” ? Rio’s editing for a reason.

   Now, let’s see what the bill REALLY says, specifically Section 3(a)(1)

   http://thomas.loc.go…

   
   (1) IN GENERAL- At the request of State, local, or Tribal law enforcement agency, the Attorney General may provide technical, forensic, prosecutorial, or any other form of assistance in the criminal investigation or prosecution of any crime that–

   (A) constitutes a crime of violence;

   (B) constitutes a felony under the State, local, or Tribal laws; and

   (C) is motivated by prejudice based on the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability of the victim, or is a violation of the State, local, or Tribal hate crime laws.

   What a difference those words make:
   The Hate Crimes statute mentioned refers only to cases that constitute a crime of VIOLENCE AND is a FELONY under state, local or Tribal law AND is motivated by prejudice based on specified criteria or violates State or local or tribal hate crimes law already .

   So let’s apply what the bill REALLY says compared to Rio’s little imaginary example: “What was once mere vandalism (e.g., an anti-gay slur found on a restroom wall) suddenly becomes a federal hate crime.” Remember, it must fulfill all THREE requirements

   First question- Vandalism “constitutes a crime of violence”? Maybe in riogrande’s strange little world, but not in this one.

   In and of itself, this is enough to disprove riogrande’s point. But let’s continue.

   Second question- Vandalism, in this case “an anti-gay slur found on a restroom wall” constitutes a felony under the State, local, or Tribal laws? Really? Since when? Again, maybe in riogrande’s little world, but not this one.

   Third question- The vandalism, in this case “an anti-gay slur found on a restroom wall” is motivated by prejudice based on the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability of the victim, or is a violation of the State, local, or Tribal hate crime laws? At best Riogrande gets this one; maybe, perhaps it was so motivated or a violation of State, local or Tribal hate crimes laws.

   So to use Riogrande’s little example, the REAL bill (not the hack and slash heavily edited version he posted here) would not apply as it fails 2 of the 3 requirements and arguably, barely meets the third.

   And by the way, the other provisions of the Federal hate crimes law (Section 6) specified it is limited to “Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, willfully causes bodily injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a firearm, or an explosive or incendiary device, attempts to cause bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin of any person.”

   Since when does vandalism “causes bodily injury to any person”?
   Since when does vandalism “through the use of fire, a firearm of an explosive or incendiary device, attempts to cause bodily injury”?

   Answer: vandalism does no such thing.

   Typical Rio.

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   1. HR:First question- Vandalism “constitutes a crime of violence”? Maybe in riogrande’s strange little world, but not in this one.

      See, e.g., United States v. Whitney, No. 99-3285 (10th Cir. 10/11/2000).  Vandalism is of the same essential character as cross-burning (offensive speech, but speech nonetheless), and it would not be a major stretch to see it prosecuted as such.  How was Whitney prosecuted?  Ethnic intimidation is seen as a crime of violence.

      HR: how you cut the parts out of caselaw that disagree with your preconceived agenda,

      And precisely which cases are those?  I invite you to visit http://home.earthlin… and cite those cases which purportedly defeat my arguments there.  Either put up or shut up.

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      1. The Hate Crimes law, which I posted the text of and linked to to disprove your little falsity demonstrates quite clearly the three criteria, all three of which must be met. As noted, you nicely and conveniently deleted them so as not to get in the way of your rant.

         Vandalism is not a “crime of violence”.
         Vandalism of the sort you described is not a “felony”.
         Vandalism of the sort you described is at best MAYBE a violation state, local or tribal hate crimes laws or based on prejudice against certain people for a particular criteria.

         Moreover, vandalism does not “causes bodily injury to any person” nor does it “through the use of fire, a firearm of an explosive or incendiary device, attempts to cause bodily injury”? (Section 6 violation)

         And then rather than admit you were wrong or try to refute, you throw up some faux caselaw, Whitney. And let’s look at Whitney for a second. Once again, rio, you got caught lying.

         Rio claims “How was Whitney prosecuted?  Ethnic intimidation is seen as a crime of violence.”

         That’s funny, because the court never said that (making it up as you go along again rio).

         Here’s the decision (notice how I post the cases and the text and rio nicely avoids doing so? that should tell you something about him)

         http://caselaw.lp.fi…

         Guess what word is missing? That’s right VIOLENCE. It is simply not there. Rio made it up. Neither is ethnic for that matter.

         You got busted, man. Bad. And rather than admit it, you are simply covering and making up even more stuff.

         With case and legal citations like this, it is no wonder you got laughed out of court over and over and over again.

         Isn’t it time you filed another frivolous lawsuit? Or your “Judicial Accountability of 2008” bill?

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         1. On the one hand, if I present my case in gruesome detail, I am berated for a lack of brevity.  On the other, if I bow to my audience’s demand for brevity, I am lambasted for failing to present my position in gruesome detail.

            Just remember: You asked for it (citations available via e-mail)!

            None Dare Call It a Felony

            Did the Colorado Supreme Court commit a serious lapse in judgment — or a federal crime? In this essay, I will argue that they are guilty of both.

            The State of the Law
            In the Reconstruction South, government officials routinely abused the “discretion” of their offices as a tool of racial oppression.  And blacks were not the only ones oppressed — white Southerners who stood up for their black neighbors were, as well.  Accordingly, our civil rights laws were designed to protect all citizens from oppression by the State.1 These laws enable citizens to sue “state actors” for civil damages and the federal government, to prosecute criminally.2

              The standard for civil and criminal liability is conceptually the same: that a government representative knowingly acted in such a way as to injure a person in the exercise of any right guaranteed under the laws of the United States.3 In practice, it’s a little more complicated than that, but not much.

            Here Cum Da Judge!
            The easiest way to illustrate this point is probably one of the most disgusting criminal cases you will ever see involving a judge. Judge David Lanier was convicted of a litany of civil rights violations — including counts stemming from incidents where he literally forced his secretary to perform oral sex until he ejaculated in her mouth. On appeal, Judge Lanier claimed that the statute4 was impermissibly vague.

            The Court was not brief,5 but its conclusion was obvious: Even a judge should know that his secretary has a Constitutional right not to be forced to give him a blowjob.

            Government officials are presumed to know settled law in their jurisdiction within the scope of their authority.6 As such, they are “on notice” as to what they can or cannot do. Therefore, once a right is defined and made specific by court decisions, violations can be prosecuted under civil rights statutes without offending the Constitution.

            Incredibly, Judge Lanier went on to argue that the government failed

            to show that he acted willfully. In Screws, the Court held that the reference to willfulness in В§ 242 requires proof of a specific intent or purpose “to deprive a person of a federal right made definite by decision or other rule of law.” It is not material whether or not the defendant was thinking in constitutional terms; rather, a defendant acts willfully when he “acts in open defiance or in reckless disregard of a constitutional requirement which has been made specific and definite.” 7

            You don’t have to specifically intend to violate a citizen’s rights or even know that you were violating the law.8 As long as you intended to do what you did, you could earn an extended vacation at Club Fed.

              The third requirement is that the government official be acting “under color of law” — a fancy term of art for acting in an official capacity. In short, Judge Lanier argued that he was just a normal American male who wasn’t getting enough at home, and couldn’t be charged criminally for his personal pursuit of sexual contact. Unimpressed, the appeals court noted that:

            An act is under color of law when it constitutes a “‘misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.'” “Under ‘color’ of law [also] means under ‘pretense’ of law.” “Acts of officers who undertake to perform their official duties are included….”9

            In Judge Lanier’s case, the fact that the assaults occurred in chambers during working hours, and his victims all had business with his court, was enough for the statute to apply.

              Throughout his appeal, Judge Lanier displayed a uniquely judicial arrogance. In an attempt to overturn his felony convictions, he invoked a form of “the Bobby Knight defense,” claiming that the forcible use of his victim’s mouth as a sperm receptacle didn’t cause bodily injury.10

            “Can’t We All Just Beat Him Up?”
            Next, we turn to an incident indelibly etched in America’s collective memory: the savage beating of Rodney King. The commanding officer on the scene, Sergeant Stacey Koon, wasn’t prosecuted for beating King to a pulp. Rather, Koon was prosecuted for failing to prevent King from being beaten to a pulp. The Ninth Circuit noted that police officers have a duty

            to intercede when their fellow officers violate the constitutional rights of a suspect or other citizen. In these cases, the constitutional right violated by the passive defendant is analytically the same as the right violated by the person who strikes the blows. Thus an officer who failed to intercede when his colleagues were depriving a victim of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable force in the course of an arrest would, like his colleagues, be responsible for subjecting the victim to a deprivation of his Fourth Amendment rights.11

            Sergeant Koon had to do hard time to learn two very hard lessons: (1) Supervisors can be criminally liable for the acts of their subordinates, and (2) at least when it comes to federal civil rights law, sins of omission are still sins.

            A Heavy Cross To Bear?
            Our final tour stop visits James Whitney, a Kansas yahoo convicted of conspiring to burn a cross on a black family’s lawn. The case lacks glamor, but it illustrates how easy it is for the average citizen to be convicted of a felony under our civil rights laws:

            Section 241 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1870 states:

              If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person . . . in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; . . .they shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; . . .

              To obtain a conviction for conspiracy under В§ 241, the government must prove that the defendant (1) knowingly agreed with another, (2) to injure a person in the exercise of any right guaranteed under the laws of the United States. . . .

              Section 241 does not require proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. . . .

              The government need not offer direct proof of an express agreement on the part of the defendant. Instead, the agreement may be informal and may be inferred entirely from circumstantial evidence. “[T]he defendant’s participation in, or connection to, the conspiracy need only be slight, if there is sufficient evidence to establish that connection beyond a reasonable doubt.” Moreover, an agreement may be inferred from a variety of circumstances, such as, “sharing a common motive, presence in a situation where one could assume participants would not allow bystanders, repeated acts, mutual knowledge with joint action, and the giving out of misinformation to cover up [the illegal activity].” 12

            Klan-style cross-burning can’t be tolerated in a civilized society. But that having been said, you have to wonder what Anthony did to warrant a twenty-one month prison sentence. Now, if he had burned the cross on the victim’s lawn, then he would have gotten what he deserved. But all he did was get drunk, build a cross, and abandon it in an alley. They gave up … and headed on over to the demolition derby.13 His buddies finished the job….

            Several points are worth noting. First and foremost, Section 241 doesn’t require that the victim be deprived of a constitutional right; any federal right will do. Second, the level of activity required to become a co-conspirator need only be slight. Finally, the fact of the conspiracy can be inferred from the conduct itself.

            Applying The Facts To The Law….
            The Average Bureaucrat….
            Meet Jim Coyle. A minor-level functionary for the Colorado Board of Law Examiners, his job is to argue the Board’s position in licensing and disciplinary disputes. But as a Colorado attorney, he also has an affirmative obligation not to knowingly make a false representation of law toward a tribunal.14 But in this 1998 statement to what he is certain to argue is an administrative “tribunal,”15 Coyle does precisely that [document not shown]:

            The actual statute is materially different, in one absolutely critical respect:

            On motion of the disciplinary counsel, and upon a showing of good cause, the hearing panel may require the applicant to submit to a mental status examination conducted by a psychiatrist or psychologist, OR to submit to a substance abuse evaluation conducted by a qualified professional of the disciplinary counsel’s choosing . . .16

            The word “or” has a clear meaning, and so does the statute. Simply put, the statute does not give the Board the right to tell an applicant which psychiatrist or psychologist he must see. And Jim Coyle is charged with that knowledge as a matter of law. But he deliberately misled his superiors, in an illicit attempt to force me to submit to an involuntary psychiatric examination.

              The Board’s scam here bears a striking resemblance to the politically-motivated abuse of psychiatry in the old Soviet Union: The Board gives several psychiatrists a steady and lucrative stream of referrals — in exchange for testimony slanted to their point of view. As psychiatry is only a few steps removed from witchcraft, and the mental fitness standards employed by the Colorado Supreme Court are so vague, anyone who submits to this travesty can kiss his professional career and personal reputation goodbye. It’s political assassination, plain and simple.

            Under the Whitney standard, Coyle’s conscious act of giving out of misinformation in furtherance of the conspiracy makes him a co-conspirator.

            ….And Harvard’s Finest:

            Meet Mary Mullarkey.  A Harvard Law School graduate, her resume includes a three-year stint as an attorney advisor for the Civil Rights Branch of the Department of Interior.  A lawyer for over 30 years, Colorado’s Chief Justice would be expected to be an expert in civil rights law.  If an L.A.P.D. sergeant like Stacey Koon is presumed to know basic civil rights law, any suggestion that Mullarkey is not aware of it is laughable on its face.

            Colorado’s Board of Law Examiners beat me to a pulp with their pens, and Chief Justice Mullarkey was legally charged with knowledge that my federal rights to due process, equal protection, religious liberty, privacy, freedom of speech, access to the courts, and to not be discriminated against on the basis of a statutorily defined disability were all being violated.  Therefore, under 18 U.S.C. В§ 242, she had an affirmative legal obligation to put a stop to it.

            Sergeant Koon can be forgiven for not wanting to stand up to three adrenaline-charged officers with  nightsticks in their hand.  But Chief Justice Mullarkey could have brought law and order to bear with one deft stroke of her pen, at no personal risk to herself.  And just like Sergeant Koon, she failed to do her job.  As such, the law holds her criminally liable for her sin of omission.

            “It’s the Cover-Up, Stupid!“
            Richard Milhous Nixon and William Jefferson Clinton could have gone down in history as two of our greatest Presidents.  But today, they both stand in disgrace — not because of what they actually did, but because of what they did to cover it up.

            We recognize that government conspiracies are far more pernicious, and far more threatening to the rule of law, than the isolated acts of rogue officers like Judge Lanier.  The Reconstruction Congress understood it, as well — and the difference between 18 U.S.C. В§ 241 and В§ 242 reflects it.  If you act alone, it’s only a misdemeanor.  But if you act in concert with others, it’s a felony, and instead of doing a few months in the county lockup, you can get ten years for conspiracy.

              This is different from normal principles of criminal law, where conspiring to do something is not always treated as harshly under law as actually doing it.  For instance, former Colorado football star Rae Carruth only got twenty years for plotting to kill his pregnant girlfriend; he faced possible execution for a murder conviction.

            During Reconstruction, the “good old boys” in the Klan had taken control of local government, and to ensure that they wouldn’t work together to deprive blacks and sympathizers of their federal rights, Congress deliberately gave the conspiracy law teeth.

            To become a co-conspirator under Section 241, all you need to do is knowingly agree with another to injure a person in the exercise of federal rights.  Any act in furtherance of the conspiracy, however slight or circumstantial, is enough to implicate you.  Thus, when Chief Justice Mullarkey agreed with the Board that my license should be denied, she became criminally liable for her acts under Section 241.

            Why?  By participating in the decision to deprive me of a license and admitting that the file had been reviewed, she admitted knowledge that I had been deprived of a hearing in accordance with the Due Process Clause, on a basis that had violated both my First and Fourth Amendment rights and federal statutory law.  And unlike Sergeant Koon, she didn’t have the luxury of being a mere bystander. She could either act to protect my federal rights, or she could continue to deprive me of them. Her action was an act of agreement with the conspiracy, and thus a felony under federal law.

            ….And The Law To Reality:
            “Justice” is reserved for lesser men.  Gods are not subject to justice because they ARE justice.  And that principle applies in the real world of government, as well.

            Stacey Koon is ‘a man on an island’.  Whenever a cop screws up, he will be crucified, because he is a lesser man.  Cops are a dime a dozen.  He doesn’t have that many favors to call in.

            But as a practical matter, a state judge is untouchable.  A designated god.  He can expect favorable treatment from fellow judges.  Government prosecutors fear to confront him because they know that they will pay a price in future cases if they fail to convict him.

            Like their Nazi counterparts during Krystallnacht, you can guarantee that the Denver and Colorado Bars will take the Fifth. After all, they know that the SS can come for them, too. Local attorney and radio commentator Dan Caplis has admitted on the air that he won’t publicly criticize a judge that he might appear in front of….

            No one criticized Hitler or Stalin, either.

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            1. . . . the ultimate motives of your assailment of the “imperialist judiciary” (Scalia’s words, not mine) and the frankness of your commentary but, if you put an argument subTitle of “Here Cum Da Judge!” in an appellate brief, it’s germane to saying to the court, “Y’all are a bunch of black-robed, white-hooded fucks.  Now rule in my favor!”

               I’m going to go out on a limb, here, and conjecture that, regardles of the institutional bias against pro se litigants, who go up against Towne Hall, that court is most certainly not going to rule in your favor.  Am I wrong?

               Remember Rick Stanley’s letter (reproduced hereinbelow, excerpte from the People v. Stanley (Colo.App.) decision, demanding his conviction be overturned:

               Charles Rose is in regard to Stanley’s gun charge and arrest of openly carrying a weapon, in violation of Thornton Ordinance TRMC38237. This ordinance violates Colorado Constitution Art. 2, Sec.3, by interfering with his natural, essential, and inalienable right to self defense, under the color of law, for the arrest, charge, and conviction against Rick Stanley. The signing of SB25 on March 18, 2003, affirms Article 2, Sec. 3, of the State Constitution, and preempts this ordinance. Rick Stanley demands that Judge Charles Rose, overturn this conviction of Stanley on constitutional grounds. Failure to do so will result in a treason charge against Charles Rose for failure to uphold the oath of office to defend the Constitutions, which this Court has a copy of, and Charles Rose swore to, as a “condition” of his office. This treason charge, will result in a Mutual Defense Pact Militia warrant for Charles Rose’s arrest if the following conditions are not met:

               1. Overturn the unconstitutional conviction of Rick Stanley for violation of TRMC 38237 because TRMC 38237 violates the constitutional rights of Rick Stanley, under the guise of “color of law.”

               2. Return the $1,500.00 bond to Rick Stanley.

               3. Return Rick Stanley’s property which consists of 1 each Smith and Wesson 6 shot .357 pistol and 6 each .357 bullets.

               This court is notified, once more, as Stanley gave Notice from the beginning of the proceeding against him, Thornton Municipal Court has “NO” jurisdiction over him in this matter.

               Accordingly, this ORDER is affirmed.
               Rick Stanley

               Now, honestly, why would a judge say, “Oh my gosh, he’s “affirmed” his Order.  I better overturn this unconstitutional conviction immediately and surrender my law license to the OARC.”  I think that maybe Rick needed to check himself in for a few weeks, don’t you?

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               1. You know the rule: “Write to your audience.”  Writing to the average Netizen and writing to a court are two very different endeavors. 

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            2. . . .

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         2. Consider this classic:
            ——————————————————-
            From: Theodore A. Kaldis (kal…@topaz.rutgers.edu)
            Subject: Re: “Rolling Queers”
            [headers snipped]

            When I first posted this story, it was in response to the suggestion that I would be inclined to go “fag bashing”.  I originally intended to post a straightforward account about how a naive youth was cajoled by some miscreant acquaintances (the proverbial “bad company”) to reluctantly accompany them on an expedition aimed at acquiring funds through a procedure that this youth considered to be of EXTREMELY dubious merit (to put it mildly), and that how this youth was EXCEPTIONALLY horrified at the events that subsequently transpired.

            But seeing as the sort of activity that occurred that evening has recently been defended as an expression of constitutionally protected freedom of speech, I decided to play a few games with the story. Unsurprisingly (and rightfully so), no one has come to my defense. Also unsurprisingly, I have since become a raving sociopath (due to, doubtless, the fact that I espouse a position that is absolutely at variance with the officially accepted politically correct view) — on the basis of a rudimentary account that no one here has a comprehensive conception or understanding of.

            > Since it looks like you really mean it, I can only say that you are > apparently a borderline sociopath.

            Excuse me, a BORDERLINE sociopath.  Declared to be so by Gene Ward Smith, an erstwhile sociopath in his own right of exemplary credentials, in an absolutely serious posting (I don’t know if this is a USENET first, but it is certainly a first for me) posted to alt.flame (among other places).  (It takes one to know one.)

            > You brag to the net about your violent, antisocial proclivities, which > is another sign of a borderline personality disorder.

            I brag about nothing.  The account I posted was perhaps wry (it was meant to be, in order to reflect the nature of life), but it was by no means comprehensive.  For the record, the only reasons these *ssholes wanted me along was because I had the car.  Me and another individual managed to evade the police primarily for the reason that we were unarmed.  (This is the guy I have lost track of — a number of years subsequent to this incident.  He too went straight and managed to stay out of trouble with the police for the years that I knew him.)  The guy in jail and the guy who OD’d were the instigators, the active participants, and the ones who were apprehended by the police.  The cops should have properly thrown their hind ends in jail, and I afterwards told them so to their face in essentially those words.

            > It’s the sort of thing rapists and muggers will sometimes do.

            Of which I am neither.  As I said, I was absolutely horrified at what went on.  Have you ever seen anyone get mugged?  It’s not a pretty sight.  In order to effectively do it, one has to be an absolute, cold sadist.  Part of the ritual is to make the victim squirm like a cornered rat.  This is what Goetz was talking about in his confession tape to the New Hampshire police when he turned himself in, and it is this that caused him to become so enraged as to shoot his assailants. Anyone who has ever witnessed this knows what he’s talking about.  All you liberals who haven’t are just blowing out your *ss.

            Moreover, I had to give the junkyard a buck to replace my tire iron, and these chumps never reimbursed me like they said they would.
            ——————————————————-
            Mugging, cross-burning, vandalism … where do we reliably draw the line?  And what assurance do we have that future courts will draw the line as intended?  This is my primary concern with this statute — Anthony got too Budweiser’d up at Neck-Car to materially participate in the scheme in Whitney, but they prosecuted him anyway.  When a court wants to ‘nail’ someone, it bends, folds, spindles, and mutilates the law beyond all possible recognition … and while, if we could count on the courts to stay within their legal bounds, the statute as drafted would probably be sufficient.  But in a nation where judges frequently re-write the law on a whim, no one can know where the line will be drawn.

            I am fully conscious of what the statute says, but the bar admission statute didn’t protect me.

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