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October 05, 2013 03:33 PM UTC

Alternative Voting Methods

  • 9 Comments
  • by: BlueCarp

Perhaps I can get some traction over here. (Perhaps not).

I believe plurality voting, when more than two candidates are on a ballot, is absurd.

I was converted to a belief in alternative voting methods after reading William Poundstone's book, "Gaming the Vote: Why Elections Aren't Fair (and What We Can Do About it)."

An excerpt from the book jacket:

At least five U.S. presidential elections have been won by the second most popular candidate, but these results were not inevitable. In fact, such an unfair outcome need never happen again, and as William Poundstone shows in Gaming the Vote, the solution is lurking right under our noses.
 
In all five cases, the vote was upset by a “spoiler”—a minor candidate who took enough votes away from the most popular candidate to tip the election to someone else. The spoiler effect is more than a glitch. It is a consequence of one of the most surprising intellectual discoveries of the twentieth century: the “impossibility theorem” of the Nobel laureate economist Kenneth Arrow. His theorem asserts that voting is fundamentally unfair—a finding that has not been lost on today’s political consultants. Armed with polls, focus groups, and smear campaigns, political strategists are exploiting the mathematical faults of the simple majority vote. The answer to the spoiler problem lies in a system called range voting, which would satisfy both right and left, and Gaming the Vote assesses the obstacles confronting any attempt to change the U.S. electoral system.
 
The latest of several books by Poundstone on the theme of how important scientific ideas have affected the real world, Gaming the Vote is both a wry exposé of how the political system really works and a call to action.
 
I seek your thoughts, both pro and con. Muchas gracias.
 
David K. Williams, Jr.
BlueCarp

Comments

9 thoughts on “Alternative Voting Methods

  1. Britain's parliamentary system has always appealed to me, especially when they shut down the whole "Let's bomb Syria" thing.

    It would make it much harder for corporations to target where their big bucks go, and to buy legislators and legislation.

    I don't buy the premise that "voting is inherently unfair."

    Other than that, I suppose I'd want to see some terms defined.

    "Plurality voting" is our present system, right? If 49.1% of registered voters vote for A, and 49% vote for B, A wins, and the rest is split among other minor candidates.

    Where does the electoral college and gerrymandered districts come into all this?

    1. Correct on the definition for plurality voting.

      The plurality voting system pretty much locks in a two-party system, because the moment a third party comes along that's strong enough to contend for a position, it tends to ruin both the third party bid and that of the candidate closest to them ideologically, leaving the minority party candidate as the victor. This is one of the many elements discouraging the formation of strong third parties and independent candidates.

      So I'd say it's not so much "unfair" as it is stagnating and limiting.

    2. In practical terms, the Electoral College usually has little to do with any perceived unfairness, though it is probably an idea whose time has passed. It no longer offers the small states the advantage it once did, because large states so massively outclass them now and most states send their EC votes as a bloc for the state winner of the Presidential race.

  2. BlueCarp: while I agree that the current voting system is not ideal – especially for third party candidates – I disagree with the author's chosen alternative, Range Voting. No voting system is perfect, but there are better systems to choose from IMHO.  I'll explore a bit in another response…

    1. In any case there is little practical value in these alternatives as there isn't a snowball's chance in hell that any such changes will occur in the foreseeable future and we have plenty to urgently deal with in the here and now, in the meantime. 

        1. Guess I'm just impatient with philosophical hypotheticals at a time when everything is plummeting to hell in a hand basket at an ever accelerating rate in the here and now. Sorry for getting snippy. Feeling pretty grumpy.

  3. So, some terms, since mj55 asked…

    Plurality (or First Past The Post) Voting: the voting system in most of our country, where the top vote-getter wins the election regardless of the percentage of the vote received. (E.g. in a six-way race, the guy with 25% could win.)

    Majority Voting: a voting system where a majority of votes (50%+1) is required to win the ballot. Used for ballot measures; also used to elect candidates in some areas, usually in conjunction with a runoff election.

    Multiple Choice Voting: a voting system where a voter can vote for more than one candidate. The candidate with the most overall votes wins, usually by plurality voting rules.

    Range Voting: a voting system where each voter ranks each candidate, e.g. 0-10. The candidate with the highest resulting average vote wins.

    Instant Runoff Voting: a voting system where voters can vote for more than one candidate, ranked highest to lowest. The votes are tallied by reading the top choice of each voter and eliminating the lowest performing candidate; voters who voted for that candidate have their next highest vote counted instead, and the cycle is repeated; when one candidate has a majority of the votes, they are the winner.

    Condorcet Voting: a voting system where voters can vote for more than one candidate, ranked highest to lowest. The candidate is chosen that wins all of (or the most) pairings when faced against each other opponent. Robert's Rules defines a limited Condorcet method that can be applied manually, but most Condorcet methods proposed for modern elections are done via computer algorithm.

    Ranked Choice Voting: a Condorcet voting system which results in each candidate receiving a ranked placement in the election (last to first).

    1. There are many mathematical theorems related to voting systems – too many for me to detail here. But if you want to read about voting systems, and in particular to see a comparison of various voting methods and the conditions they satisfy and fail, look to Wikipedia's Voting system page.

      Suffice it to say, no voting system is perfect. Each can be gamed in various ways, and each has its flaws. I'll list the most glaring of each of the above methods here:

      Plurality: multiple majority viewpoint candidates can wind up losing to a single minority viewpoint candidate. (This happened last year in California with its new open primary system…)

      Instant Runoff: similar to plurality, if a race comes down to three candidates, the elimination process can eliminate the strongest contender. E.g. a conservative at 35%, a center-right candidate at 30% and a moderate liberal at 35% would eliminate the center-right candidate and elect the moderate liberal, though the center-right candidate was probably preferred by more voters overall.

      Range Voting: Partisan voters can use the ranking system to sink opposing candidates. E.g. an ultra-conservative receives consistent 10s from the 30% of the electorate who are his supporters, who give every other candidate a 0; the moderate liberal in the race receives the top rank from 52% of voters, but it's a mixed set of voters not thrilled with the choice and only give him an average of 6, while giving the ultra-conservative a 1 or a 2. The ultra-conservative wins the race.

      Condorcet: If carefully planned, voters could cause an otherwise strong candidate to lose to their chosen candidate by voting for a third candidate. This condition is minimized if everyone ranks all choices. Unfortunately, this could lead to a second condition where a person's ranking of multiple choices could cause their preferred candidate to lose. (This latter problem is also present in most of the alternative voting systems defined above…)

      Ranked Choice (or Ranked Pairs): see Condorcet. Ranked Choice, like most Condorcet methods, is not easy to understand or demonstrate to the average populace – votes go in, results come out, and a single ballot can really change the results in seemingly unpredictable ways. Again, this is true of many alternative voting systems and unlike plurality voting.

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